The Influence of Corruption on the Conduct of Recreational Hunting

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Introduction

Set in the more general context of how corruption can affect both wildlife conservation and wider societal interests, this chapter discusses how corruption might allegedly influence the conduct of recreational hunting. First, the chapter seeks a brief understanding of the influence of corruption on wider society. Second, it outlines what is known of the ways that corruption may influence conservation outcomes. Third, it reviews alleged cases of corruption in recreational hunting from around the world. Fourth, it discusses a detailed case of the conduct of recreational hunting in one country, and the measures needed for its reform. Finally, it discusses some key challenges for proponents of recreational hunting who wish to reform its governance practices. Our overview suggests that various developing, transformation or developed countries could have equally served as case studies, but our focus on Tanzania reflects 18 years of combined experience for two authors as senior advisors within the Government of Tanzania’s Wildlife Department.

Corruption and its role in wider society

Corruption has a long history in the conduct of human affairs (Azfar et al., 2001). As the old adage runs, ‘everyone has their price’. Modern definitions of corruption range from general Oxford English Dictionary formulations like ‘rendering morally unsound’ and ‘acting dishonestly or unfaithfully’, to the much more specific ‘unlawful use of public office for private gain’ (Transparency International, 2007). Transparency International’s definition accepts that only holders of public office practise corruption, and this chapter follows that definition. Nevertheless, instigating or agreeing to corrupt deals equally involves members of the public or the private sector, who act dishonestly by offering bribes or seeking an inequitable distribution of public services to their personal advantage (Transparency International, 2007).

Corruption can manifest itself among wider society in many ways, including: embezzling public funds; demanding bribes to overlook illegal activities; and, offering patronage, nepotism and political influence (Kaufmann, 1997). These forms of corrupt practice have consequences for wider society, by adding to transaction costs, impacting on investor and donor confidence, and limiting economic growth and productivity (Azfar et al., 2001). Corruption is especially prevalent in countries with weak institutions or transitional governments (Barrett et al., 2001). While the impact of corruption on social and economic development is widely recognised (Bardhan, 1997), conservation scientists have only recently begun to analyse its impacts (Smith, Muir et al., 2003; Smith & Walpole, 2005; Wright et al., 2007).

Corruption and its impacts on conservation outcomes

How might corruption influence conservation outcomes? Many areas of high conservation priority occur in developing countries (Smith, Muir et al., 2003). Where corruption limits inward investment to, and suppresses development in, biodiversity-rich countries, it may actually have a positive outcome for biodiversity (Laurence, 2004). In contrast, biodiversity-rich areas may be threatened if corruption impacts on the effectiveness of conservation: for example by reducing the availability of funds, encouraging poor law enforcement, reducing political support for conservation, and/or increasing incentives to over-exploit resources. Consequently, corruption may influence conservation outcomes in complex ways (Barrett et al., 2006), as illustrated by case
Corruption and its impacts on recreational hunting

The conduct of recreational hunting is often linked with corrupt practices, particularly in poor countries that attract foreign tourist hunters willing to spend large sums of foreign exchange to hunt prime trophies. In turn, tourist hunting can attract outfitters who seek to circumvent legal controls over biological, ethical and financial aspects of the hunting industry through: exceeding or misusing quotas; poor hunting practices; and flouting of foreign exchange regulations. One solution to such management shortcomings is to ban tourist hunting. Tourists have hunted in at least 23 sub-Saharan African countries, but among the prime destinations, hunting has been banned in Kenya from 1977 to the present, in Uganda from 1967 until 2001 when hunting restarted on a trial basis, and in Tanzania from 1973 to 1977 (Price Waterhouse, 1996; Barnett & Patterson, 2006; Lamprey & Mugisha, this volume).

Despite assumed links between corruption, the conduct of recreational hunting and the consequent loss opportunities to hunt, no systematic study, to our knowledge, has previously examined the possible impacts of such linkages. Consequently, we undertook a web-based search using the two terms
corruption and hunting, which identified several relevant web pages that featured alleged links between corrupt practices and the conduct of recreational hunting in different countries. While none was verified independently, these cases illustrate the alleged involvement of different levels of public office holder, ranging from field staff to senior public servants and political leaders (Table 18.1). However, these cases cannot generalise any formal relationships between corruption and the conduct of recreational hunting. In this sense, recreational hunting differs little from other aspects of conservation, where the influence of corruption remains poorly documented or researched. Hence more detailed case studies are needed, so we next consider Tanzania, a prime destination for classic African hunting safaris since the early days of the East African Protectorate (Hurt & Ravn, 2000), and a source of concern over the alleged influence of corruption on the conduct of its tourist hunting industry since the early 1970s (Planning and Assessment for Wildlife Management (PAWM) 1996a).

**Governance and tourist hunting in Tanzania**

This section draws on official and other reports, published literature and frequent allegations of practices parallel to those alleged for recreational hunting elsewhere (Table 18.1), that may also occur in Tanzania (see Table 18.2).

**Governance in Tanzania**

Tanzania gained independence from British colonial rule in 1964, and soon adopted a policy of socialist self-reliance. Since independence, Tanzania has suffered from a very low GDP, low per-capita incomes of ~US$200 per annum, a well-developed parallel economy and poor governance (Maliyamkono & Bagachawa, 1990; Transparency International, 2007). Indeed, the Commission Report on the State of Corruption in the Country (United Republic of Tanzania (URT), 1996) noted that corruption had grown since the 1970s through a combination of circumstances, including the poor economy, low salaries, lack of essential commodities, and restrictions on public servants earning extra income. When the economy was liberalised during the 1990s, the Commission noted the emergence of endemic and systemic corruption through a combination of factors, including businessmen developing close
Table 18.1  Web pages that feature alleged links between corrupt practices and the conduct of recreational hunting in different countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue (1), level (2) and country (3)</th>
<th>Alleged incident</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)  Misappropriation of fines for illegal hunting (2) Field officer (3) USA</td>
<td>State conservation officer in Kentucky allegedly directed two convicted poachers of deer and turkey to send fines to his postbox, and took further payments totaling US$9500 from poachers’ mother.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)  Inappropriate involvement of officials in hunting endangered species (2) 'High level' government official (3) Vietnam</td>
<td>Alleged hunting of endangered gaur <em>Bos gaurus</em> by high-ranking government official and lawyer with whom he had close ties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)  Inappropriate involvement of officials in offering hunting opportunities (2) 'High level' government official (3) Russia</td>
<td>Case of graft brought against head of Altai region’s hunting control inspectorate, when discovered he also allegedly ran agency organising hunting trips.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)  Misallocation of concessions (2) Director of National Parks and Wildlife Management (3) Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Charge of corruptly granting hunting rights to outfitter who had not paid required bid before beginning to unlawfully hunt, but charge fell because State failed to prove <em>prima facie</em> case against Director.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)  Lost opportunities for local communities (2) Members of Parliament (3) Croatia</td>
<td>Alleged attempt by Croatian Hunting Association to hijack share of concession fees formerly due to landowners by proposed changes to law on hunting, to vary distribution of funds collected through hunting ground concessions, and to reduce area covered by hunting grounds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)  Inequitable allocation of hunting opportunities to rich foreigners (2) Senior politicians (3) Pakistan</td>
<td>High level political support allegedly offered to hunting parties from neighbouring Arab countries to hunt large numbers of houbara bustards <em>Chlamydotis undulata</em>, although the species continues to decline.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*www.biggamehunt.net/forums/viewtopic.php?t=13854&sid=d%E2%80%A6; †www.cpj.org/protests/03ltrs/Vietnam30apr03pl.html; ‡www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,1941743,00.html; §www.zimconservation.com/archives/7-76.htm; ¶see.oneworldsee.org/article/view/111868/1/; **www.american.edu/TED/pakistan-hunting.htm
ties with leaders, erosion of integrity among leaders, and lack of transparency in the economy. Consequently, the Commission noted two groups of corrupt officials in Tanzania (URT, 1996):

- those accepting bribes to supplement meagre incomes and make ends meet: this type of corruption is rampant in all economic sectors, including natural resources and tourism, for example, where wildlife officers take bribes to free poachers;
- those high-level officials, public servants and elected representatives whose earnings, property and savings portfolios exceed basic needs: this type of corruption feeds greed among the leadership, comprising elected politicians and chief executives in the public sector. Again, it includes the natural resources and tourism sectors, where, for example, interference occurs in executive decisions to allocate hunting blocks.

**History of tourist hunting in Tanzania**

The British colonial administration encouraged the development of safari hunting, while simultaneously restricting opportunities for traditional African hunting (Leader-Williams, 2000). Just before independence, Tanzania introduced Africa’s first system to lease hunting blocks to outfitters in a network of game reserves that then covered 8 per cent of Tanzania’s surface area (PAWM, 1996a). After independence, several game reserves including Selous were declared ‘national projects’, enabling retention of hunting revenues to fund wildlife management and infrastructural development, which soon proved successful when commercial poaching ceased and wildlife populations thrived (Nicholson, 1970, 2001).

Once the ban on tourist hunting was lifted in 1978, the parastatal Tanzania Wildlife Corporation (TAWICO) was given a monopoly on managing hunting blocks, but in practice sublet many blocks to private, and mainly European, outfitters. Because of ongoing corruption, TAWICO’s monopoly was officially relaxed in 1984 when nine private outfitters were allocated hunting blocks for periods of up to four years (PAWM, 1996a; Nshala, 2001).

The Wildlife Department took over management of the increasingly lucrative tourist hunting industry in 1988, while TAWICO continued to offer hunting opportunities like other outfitters. To increase hunting opportunities, the Wildlife Department close to doubled the numbers of hunting blocks to c.130.
These covered ~180,000 km² or ~25 per cent of Tanzania’s land surface, and were evenly distributed between unoccupied game reserves and areas occupied by people, thereby offering tourist hunting the opportunity to contribute to community-based conservation (PAWM, 1996a; Nshala, 2001).

Constraints in the management of tourist hunting

With assistance from USAID, the Government of Tanzania established the Planning and Assessment for Wildlife Management (PAWM) project in 1990. PAWM was mandated inter alia to advise the Director of Wildlife on constraints faced by the tourist hunting industry and to propose policies to maximise its potential. PAWM ran workshops to discuss tourist hunting in 1993 and community-based conservation in 1994 (Leader-Williams et al., 1996a, 1996b). Here we use PAWM’s work, together with work funded through German development assistance, to compare these constraints with alleged cases of corruption in recreational hunting elsewhere (Table 18.1).

Three broad levels of public office holder, ranging from field staff to senior public servants and political leaders, may be responsible for imposing constraints on the management of tourist hunting in Tanzania (cf. URT, 1996). In terms of level of public office holder, alleged infringements of hunting regulations in the field (Table 18.2) are most understandable (cf. URT, 1996), given that wildlife scouts earn an annual salary of <US$500, while a tourist hunter may pay US$100,000 for a three-week safari. Of much greater concern are constraints arising from decisions of mid- to senior-level staff in the Wildlife Department’s headquarters who set quotas, issue licences, collect fees and allocate most hunting blocks (Table 18.2). Their decisions potentially impact many aspects of hunting, from ensuring its biological sustainability to maximising its financial returns and subsequent reinvestment in the resource, and to involving local communities fully in hunting conducted outside game reserves. Of equal concern is patronage and nepotism involving senior politicians, while perhaps the least tractable is the most senior politicians offering exclusive rights to foreigners presumably considered to be of financial or other strategic importance (Table 18.2).

In terms of issue, greatest concern perhaps centres on the manner of allocating hunting blocks (Table 18.2), as noted by the Commission Report on the State of Corruption in the Country in its evidence on the growth of systemic corruption in Tanzania (URT, 1996). Because outfitters do not compete to
Table 18.2  Constraints to effective management of tourist hunting in Tanzania, showing the key issue, the level of public office holder involved and the management concern each constraint raises.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue (1), level (2) and management concern (3)</th>
<th>Constraints to effective management</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Infringements of hunting regulations</td>
<td>Use of baits too close to national park boundaries; hunting from a vehicle; hunting at night with a spotlight; hunting within 500 m of a watering hole or at a salt lick; overshooting quotas; shooting second animal with better trophy; killing females.</td>
<td>Leader-Williams <em>et al.</em> (1996a); Spong <em>et al.</em> (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Ethical and biological</td>
<td>Quotas mainly set on basis of informed guesswork, with little reference to adaptive management; when blocks subdivided, each remains with previous quota; hunting licences issued to outfitters and filed and checked manually, making effective management of quotas difficult.</td>
<td>Severe (1996); Planning and Assessment for Wildlife Management (PAWM) (1996b); Nshala (2001); Baldus &amp; Cauldwell (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Managing quotas and issuing licences</td>
<td>Tanzania Wildlife Protection Fund (TWPF) established in 1974 to assist Wildlife Department manage wildlife throughout Tanzania; initially, TWPF retained 25 per cent of game fees; since 1989 TWPF retained 100 per cent of observer, conservation, permit and trophy hunting fees paid by tourist hunters; custom-made, computerised hunting management system not implemented as computer-generated receipts said to be not in line with Government regulations; Wildlife Department unable to properly account for fees worth millions of dollars each year.</td>
<td>PAWM (1996a, 1996b); Baldus &amp; Cauldwell (2004)</td>
</tr>
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Table 18.2  Continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue (1), level (2) and management concern (3)</th>
<th>Constraints to effective management</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Lack of competition in allocating hunting blocks and fixed right-to-use fees</td>
<td>Tanzania’s non-competitive system of allocating hunting blocks produces low returns; despite introduction of fixed block fees in 1993, returns in Tanzania are c.10 times lower than the competitive US$100,000 to 250,000 right-to-use fees paid by outfitters in other southern African hunting destinations; WD and TAHOA, the professional hunters’ association, block further competition.</td>
<td>Price Waterhouse (1996); Saiwana (1996); Nshala (2001); Barnett &amp; Patterson, (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Minister, Director of Wildlife</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Financial</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Abuse of Presidential Licence</td>
<td>Presidential licences regularly issued to friends of the Minister or Director, or to former holders of these posts; does not require any licence fees to be paid for animals killed.</td>
<td>Nshala (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Minister, Director of Wildlife</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Financial</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Patronage and nepotism in allocating hunting blocks</td>
<td>Many concessions allegedly leased to smaller national companies silently owned by senior public officials with political links in Ministry or Wildlife Department; most national safari outfitters acquiring</td>
<td>Nshala (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Senior politicians, Minister, Director of Wildlife</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(3) Financial and biological concessions through patronage lack capacity to effectively market hunting opportunities, nor employ qualified professional hunters; concessions allegedly sub-leased, mostly to non-resident foreigners, and income generated does not enter Tanzania; revenue authorities cannot assess funds due for taxation; foreign professional hunters who sub-lease blocks only take a short-term view, and maximise off takes during their lease.

(1) High-level political decisions to offer foreigners exclusive hunting opportunities
(2) Former President
(3) Ethical, biological and financial

Administration of former President granted hunting block in Loliondo to group from United Arab Emirates for 10 years, twice as long as previous maximum length for block concessions in Tanzania; lease agreed allegedly without consulting Director of Wildlife or local communities living in Loliondo; concession re-allocated to same group without competition in 2002.

Nshala (2001)
pay right-to-use fees, some outfitters have leased hunting blocks at well below market prices for long periods, in turn leading to massive losses of revenue for the Government over the years. Furthermore, these losses are not compensated by an increasingly complex system of pay-as-use fees levied on the hunter (Baker, 1997). Nevertheless, senior staff in the Wildlife Department who allocate the blocks have continued to defend the system, together with those outfitters who benefit from it (Nshala, 2001). Meanwhile, the Presidential decision to grant a group from the United Arab Emirates exclusive hunting rights in Loliondo may have some parallels with the decision to offer bustard hunting opportunities in Pakistan to neighbouring Arab countries (Table 18.1).

**Impacts of alleged corruption on tourist hunting**

The impacts of alleged corruption on the outcome of tourist hunting will be complex (Table 18.2), as with other aspects of conservation (Smith & Walpole, 2005). For example, the biological impact of not enforcing hunting regulations might reduce the sustainability of tourist hunting, such as if male lions *Panthera leo* are drawn out of national parks by baiting too close to their boundary (Loveridge *et al.*, 2006) or if female leopards *Panthera pardus* are shot (Spong *et al.*, 2000). However, outfitters who retain the same hunting blocks, by whatever means, probably take a long-term view over husbanding hunting opportunities in their blocks. Thus a study of lions in an area of Selous Game Reserve retained by the same outfitter since 1967 suggested that existing quotas were too high, but that actual off takes were much lower than those allowed by the quota and appeared sustainable (Creel & Creel, 1997). Therefore, we here seek to generalise some of the biological and financial impacts of the alleged role of corruption for tourist hunting, first for an unoccupied game reserve and, second, for people living inside hunting areas such as game controlled areas, or whose lands border game reserves.

**Conservation impacts in the Selous Game Reserve**

The 50,000 km² Selous Game Reserve (SGR) is the best known hunting area in Tanzania. Currently a World Heritage Site and an IUCN Category IV protected area, SGR has long been supported through revenue from tourist hunting (Nicholson, 1970, 2001). The management of SGR collapsed following the hunting ban in the mid-1970s, and by the late 1980s its annual operating budget
from the Treasury was US$150,000, equivalent to US$ 3 per km². Meanwhile, commercial poaching for ivory, rhino horn and meat reduced SGR’s elephant population from 110,000 in the mid-1970s to less than 30,000 in 1989, while black rhinos were reduced from over 3000 to probably less than 100 (Siege, 2000). Wildlife staff were allegedly instrumental in the poaching, acting on orders from their superiors or from politicians.

Tanzania requested German development assistance in the mid-1980s to restore the SGR. The Selous Conservation Programme (SCP) began at the end of 1987, and sought to achieve two long-term goals: first, to reintroduce management systems and rehabilitate the infrastructure of SGR; and second, to encourage community-based natural resources management in the 15,000 km² of buffer zones around SGR. To secure these goals long-term once German funding ended, SCP sought a sustainable income for SGR, and succeeded in difficult negotiations to retain 50 per cent of the Treasury’s share of game fees to use directly for SGR management (PAWM, 1996a; Baldus, 2003). The funding allocated by the Treasury to SGR increased sixfold to US$900,000 when the retention scheme started in 1994, and had further increased to US$2.8 million, equivalent to US$ 60 per km², by 2003. Tourist hunting provided around 90 per cent of all SGR’s retained revenue, while more than 100 photographic tourists were needed to achieve the returns derived from a single tourist hunter (Planning and Assessment for Wildlife Management (PAWM), 1996d; Baldus et al., 2003). These increases in retained revenue allowed SGR to top up staff salaries and introduce proper allowances for game scouts, and to improve management and infrastructure. In turn, elephant numbers have since recovered to around 70,000 and continue to increase (URT, 2007), while most other wildlife populations including black rhinos have also begun to recover. Thus, the changes in fortune of SGR appear closely tied to the potential of retained revenue from tourist hunting to develop a sustainable funding base. Unfortunately, once the SCP ended in 2003, the Government of Tanzania has not since fully honoured the retention scheme agreed in 1994, and disbursements have been much less than the previously agreed 50 per cent share of fees due to the Treasury (Baldus, 2006).

Impacts on benefit-sharing with local communities

Various measures have been officially agreed by the Government of Tanzania to allow local communities to share benefits from hunting carried out either on their own land, or in protected areas bordering their land. The then Prime
Minister issued a directive in 1992 stating that district councils on whose land hunting took place should receive 25 per cent of the Treasury share of game fees, in order to compensate local people for the costs of living with wildlife (PAWM, 1996a; Nshala, 2001). If appropriately and equitably shared, this would have equated to significant sums even in the early 1990s (Planning and Assessment for Wildlife Management (PAWM), 1996c). Nevertheless, it remains unclear if this revenue was always distributed to district councils, let alone shared by district councils with local communities (Nelson et al., 2007), as with revenue accruing to district councils from tourism in the Masai Mara, Kenya (Thompson & Homewood, 2002).

In addition to direct sharing of revenue, workshops on tourist hunting and community-based conservation held in the 1990s agreed that local communities should control resource use on their land in buffer areas outside more strictly protected areas (Leader-Williams et al., 1996a, 1996b). Indeed, the resulting ‘Policy for Wildlife Conservation and Utilisation’ subsequently endorsed the establishment of Wildlife Management Areas (WMA) under community control (Ministry of Tourism, Natural Resources and Environment (MTNRE), 1998). Furthermore, WMAs were also mandated by official policies in other sectors, including the Poverty Reduction Strategy of Tanzania (Baldus et al., 2004). These policies recognised that the best-suited land use option to generate funds for WMAs in many parts of Tanzania would be tourist hunting (PAWM, 1996c, 1996d), but the development of WMAs has been seriously delayed (Nelson et al., 2007). There is still no clear schedule for sharing financial benefits from tourist hunting with local communities, nor an agreed way for local communities to decide which outfitter hunts on their land or to agree quotas for such hunting (Nelson et al., 2007). Officially, it has been noted that reforms such as establishing WMAs should not be rushed, but the reform process has been ongoing for over 15 years, leading to speculation that opportunities for private gain by senior public officials and officers of TAOHA underlie such delays (Nshala, 2001; Baldus et al., 2004). Indeed, the recent Wildlife Conservation (Non-Consumptive Wildlife Utilization) Regulations 2007 have concentrated all management powers and revenues centrally, instead of devolving such powers to, and sharing benefits with, local communities.

In the meantime, pending implementation of WMAs, outfitters are required both to contribute towards wildlife protection and to support local communities. However, these requirements are only vaguely specified and cannot be effectively evaluated (Nshala, 2001). Hence only a few outfitters voluntarily support communities through schemes such as the Cullman Wildlife...
Project (Robin Hurt Safaris, 1996), while most hesitate over community empowerment, feeling greater security in perpetuating the state-controlled monopoly over wildlife, compared with facing the unknowns of democratically elected village committees (Nelson et al., 2007). Outfitters also fear the advent of competition from other operators if communities are empowered to develop a market-based approach to concession lease fees in WMAs (Baldus & Cauldwell, 2004). Therefore, it is also widely speculated that the delay in implementing WMAs has in part arisen from high-level influence by leading outfitters through TAHOA, the professional association for outfitters in Tanzania (Nshala, 2001).

A special case where decisions have allegedly been taken out of the hands of local communities by even higher authority is Loliondo Game Controlled Area (Table 18.2), with its prime position within the migration of ungulates through the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem. Reports have alleged breaches of hunting regulations and human rights abuses against local Masai, while a long airstrip has been built and allows military aircraft to fly in hunting parties with their vehicles and equipment, and to fly out trophies, meat and live animals, apparently with no reference to local communities. The Government of Tanzania defends its decision to allocate the block in this way, citing the block fees of US$300,000 and payment in full for the quota.

For all these various reasons, local communities are increasingly frustrated that promised benefits from tourist hunting, and the promised reform of wildlife policy to establish WMAs, have not so far been forthcoming. Such frustration may in turn encourage local communities to revert to poaching or habitat conversion, or to convert hunting blocks into photographic tourism areas (Nelson et al., 2007), unless reforms are forthcoming.

### The need for reform

Tanzania could reform its tourist hunting industry by implementing the *Policy and Management Plan for Tourist Hunting* (Table 18.3) developed following workshops held in 1993 and 1994 (Leader-Williams et al., 1996a, 1996b). This policy was accepted by the then Director of Wildlife, but was never subsequently signed by the Minister, nor implemented. Political will to reform the tourist hunting industry has since been lacking (Nelson et al., 2007), despite empirical studies showing the benefits that could accrue to the national exchequer, to the
management of individual game reserves and to local communities (PAWM, 1996c, 1996d; Baldus & Cauldwell, 2004). Since 2006, reform of the tourist hunting industry has again become an issue for the Government of Tanzania. A technical committee prepared a draft proposal to reform the administration (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT), 2006), the discussion of which has involved public accusations of institutionalized
corruption that has lead to massive losses of revenue for Tanzania’s wildlife sector.

**Future challenges for recreational hunting globally?**

The struggle for good governance is a universal truth. In terms of conservation, corruption is neither restricted to recreational hunting, nor to Tanzania. However, debates over the role of corruption in conservation (Smith, Muir *et al.*, 2003) remain heavily contested (Barrett *et al.*, 2006). While further research is needed, the negative consequences of endemic and systemic corruption are well enough understood to initiate some actions. However, reform of alleged corruption in recreational hunting (Tables 18.1 and 18.2) will prove easier to articulate than to implement, as in Tanzania. Indeed, senior officials and elected politicians will resist changes to the status quo because of the wealth they accrue from current practices in recreational hunting. There appear parallels with ‘the curse of oil’, where oil wealth in poorly governed countries helps entrench powerful elites (Shaxson, 2007). Given their power, reform of corrupt practices is unlikely to come from public officials and elected politicians within countries with poor governance. Therefore, what avenues are open to reform the governance of recreational hunting?

First, many expect the international donor and NGO community to follow a policy of no-tolerance and encourage appropriate and stepwise reforms in conservation, as has occurred in other sectors (Smith, Muir *et al.*, 2003). Currently, many donors and NGOs bemoan institutionalised and systemic corruption, but continue to provide unconditional budgetary support. However, persuading donors and NGOs not to fund projects in stable countries with diversifying and growing economies, may be naïve. If donors stand off from funding projects in favoured countries such as Tanzania and Mozambique (Hanlon, 2004), then whom should they support?

Second, hunters could deflect opposition to recreational hunting and adopt a consumer-based policy of no-tolerance. While hunting bans are widely advocated, they may remove incentives to retain land under wildlife management, whether in formally protected areas or in areas occupied by people outside more strictly protected areas (Child, 1995). Recreational hunting can be a powerful tool to finance conservation and to generate income for rural communities through nature-friendly ecotourism, even when sub-optimally managed in countries like Tanzania. Therefore, the hunting industry itself
should develop principles and guidelines for improving the sustainability of recreational hunting, and increase pressure on countries, wildlife administrations and hunting industries that perform against such principles (Baldus et al., 2008).

Finally, local communities in many countries like Tanzania feel betrayed that benefits promised from recreational hunting have failed to materialise. Ironically, Tanzania’s recent policies have articulated devolving responsibility for wildlife management to local communities (MTNRE, 1998). In practice, the opposite has occurred, and its benefits have instead been centralised into the hands of elites (Nelson et al., 2007). Consequently, local people and civil society should be encouraged to press their democratically elected representatives for appropriate reforms. For recreational hunting, the critical link lies between land rights and wildlife management (Nelson et al., 2007), which local community-based organisations are particularly well suited to articulate.

All these suggested avenues to reform the governance of recreational hunting will prove difficult, and none should be considered in isolation. Successful reform of endemic and systemic corruption, though likely to be slow, will lie in judiciously combining approaches in a stepwise and probably situation-specific fashion. Hence, lessons learned in one situation should be made available elsewhere (Smith & Walpole, 2005). Without such reforms, proponents of recreational hunting will continue to be challenged when extolling its benefits by increasingly well organised opposition.

Acknowledgments

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Notes

1 http://www.awionline.org/pubs/Quarterly/su02/loliondo.htm
2 http://www.ntz.info/gen/n01526.html
3 http://www.tanzania.go.tz/wildlife2503eng.htm
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